



Canadian Study  
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# The National Growth of a Regional Party

COLLABORATION BETWEEN CONSERVATIVE PARTY OF CANADA  
LOCAL PARTY ORGANIZATIONS

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The Canadian Study of Parliament Group (CSPG), as part of its efforts to foster knowledge and understanding of Canadian parliamentary institutions, is sponsoring the annual National Essay Competition. College and university undergraduate and graduate students in any discipline across Canada are invited to submit essays on any subject matter broadly related to Parliament, legislatures or legislators. The winning essays are made available free of charge, in both official languages, on the CSPG Web site. The views and opinions contained in these papers are those of the authors and are not necessarily reflective of those of the CSPG.

## Introduction

The most important development in the post-1993 Canadian party system is the rebuilding of a viable conservative party. The creation of the Conservative Party of Canada ended a decade-long division between two factions of conservatives who formed camps in the Western-based Reform Party of Canada and the Progressive Conservative Party. With the populist ideology of the Reform Party (renamed Canadian Reform Conservative Alliance in 1999) (Flanagan 2009; Stewart and Sayers 2015), the professionalism of the Progressive Conservative Party (Flanagan 2008), and a competitive advantage in the realm of party finance (Flanagan and Jansen 2009), the Conservative Party of Canada won power in 2006 soon after its formation in 2003. The national party organization and its campaigns have drawn the attention of many scholars; yet, little is known about Conservative Party operations at the grassroots. This essay addresses the gap by analyzing one unique trait of the Conservative Party on the ground: collaboration between local party organizations.

Collaboration is defined here as one local party organization helping elect candidates in other constituencies. Under the franchise model of party organization, local branches are only concerned with raising votes in their given riding (Carty 2002: 743-44). Collaboration should not occur in theory because the local party organization is solely concerned with activities leading to the election of their local candidate. Despite this, the Conservative Party had roughly 100 local party organizations that exchanged \$1 million and \$2 million during the 2008 and 2011 election years, respectively. The money which exited these local branches through inter-association

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funding transfers had the effect of helping elect candidates beyond their riding boundaries. Why would one Conservative local party organization give money to another?

I argue collaboration occurs in response to resource overages and electoral stability at the riding-level which allows some associations to realize a secondary market for campaign spending. I draw this conclusion from a regional breakdown of inter-association funding and binomial logistic regression that makes use of riding-level variables. The nature of the dataset prevents me from claiming that collaboration is a new phenomenon. However, changes between the 2008 and 2011 elections years suggest that collaboration is a component of institutionalization in the Conservative Party of Canada.

Collaboration within the Conservative Party reveals institutional responses to regional problems built into the party system. Evidence presented in this essay shows that the Conservative Party used inter-association funding transfers as a strategic maneuver for expanding electoral support beyond its regional stronghold in Western Canada. Conservatives have long benefited from electoral support overages in the West, although these votes are confined by riding boundaries and may only potentially result in winning 104 of the 338 seats available in Parliament.<sup>1</sup> Money does not face this problem. Money is a fungible commodity that can be easily transferred and used to acquire vital materials for campaigning in strategically important ridings. It can also be used to build up party organizations in regions that are less capable of maintaining competent local associations. The Conservative Party made use of financial resource overages in Alberta to build up local party organizations in other provinces, especially those in Ontario and Atlantic Canada that received much of these transfers. In this

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<sup>1</sup> This essay studies the electoral system containing 308 seats in Parliament, of which 92 are in Western Canada. The 42<sup>nd</sup> Parliament (2015 - ) contains 338 seats following the decennial redistribution process that began in 2012.

view, collaboration between local party organizations facilitated the national growth of a regional party.

### **The Conservative Party of Canada and the Franchise Model of Party Organization**

The following section provides a brief overview of the institutions that inform the structure of party organizations. The story about the Conservative Party on the ground must begin with Carty's (2002) franchise model of party organization. The logic of the single member plurality electoral system requires parties to organize campaigns in each riding. This produces local organizations with varying competencies that determine the resources available to each campaign. It also produces local organizations that execute campaigns in isolation from other components of the party on the ground. The discussion shifts to situate the Conservative Party against the Liberal Party of Canada, with specific attention to catch-all versus brokerage politics. The section ends by considering the regional consequences from the catch-all politics practiced by the Conservative Party, as well as organizational implications from recent changes to the party finance regime.

The franchise model of party organization is a central component of political parties in Canada. Carty (2002) argues the franchise model enables Canadian parties to reconcile competing logics for winning power in the regionally and ethno-linguistically diverse electorate. On the one hand, parties require nationally appealing leaders and policies that transcend any single riding or region. On the other, parties need riding associations and constituency campaigns that directly appeal to local voters and build up regional support. The single-member plurality electoral system requires parties to field candidates in each of the 338 ridings if they intend to form government. The franchise model accommodates these competing tasks by empowering

local party organizations to campaign in locally desirable ways.<sup>2</sup> For the most part, this entails selecting a candidate from the riding who in theory acts as a local delegate within the party in public office. National leadership is given the autonomy to select policies and broker disputes that may arise between delegates who champion competing views within the party. The relationship between the local and national organization informs the division of labour during election campaigns; specifically, local party organizations are tasked with the responsibility for executing campaigns in their given ridings (743-44).

Local party organizations take responsibility over constituency campaigns to maximize electoral appeal. The electorate faces political, social, and economic issues that are experienced as idiosyncratic problems specific to each riding. Parties maximize their electoral competitiveness by selecting candidates who know which political, social, and economic issues are most pressing to local voters. Sometimes this means executing a constituency campaign that deviates from themes espoused by the national party campaign. Local party organizations, or the franchise outlet in each constituency, retain control over their campaign so they may deviate from the national campaign when doing so increases the prospects for winning the riding. Constituency campaigns come to resemble the “riding style” and “partisan organizational ethos” of the local members (Sayers 1999:133).

Riding style captures the social-economic and geographic features of each constituency that influences the competency of local party organizations and the level of competition between parties. The competency of the local branch is its ability to sustain party life between election,

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<sup>2</sup> I use the term local party organizations to describe the party on the ground. Local party organizations are comprised of electoral district associations (EDAs), which are also commonly referred to as riding associations, and constituency campaigns. I use these terms inter-changeably throughout this essay because distinctions between both components are not essential to my argument. Readers should refer to Sayers (1999) for a detailed discussion about the relationship between riding associations and constituency campaigns, or the potential divisions that may arise between them.

recruit volunteers and solicit donations, and maximize the amount of effort made during campaigns. Research shows that candidate quality, incumbency, and region are powerful determinants of competency (for example, Carty and Eagles 2005; Coletto 2010). It also shows that, despite varying levels of competency, parties may benefit from riding styles when the electorate is predisposed to electing one political party. This results in electoral stability in some ridings and high volatility in others. The riding style may render some ridings to be very uncompetitive, like constituencies in Alberta that repeatedly elect Conservative candidates or those in Montreal that elect Liberals. The resources generated by the local party organization may be more effective when used by campaigns in districts with more competitive riding styles.

Partisan organizational ethos is the second factor influencing “the style and content of the local campaign” (Sayers 1999: 133). Partisan organization ethos is the degree of ideological alignment between the local and national party. It is the local party commitment to the national party agenda and may prevent local branches from acting as subservient to the national office. The franchise model enables the local membership to select candidates who may not share the same policy agenda as the national party office. In such instances these candidates seek the nomination to gain entry to public office and use the party as their electoral vehicle. This is not to say that these candidates will vote against their party in parliament, but they may pursue an agenda that deviates from the main agenda of the national party. Local members may also select candidates who are committed to the party program and share the same ideological aspirations. The local membership’s power to select candidates and determine the partisan alignment with the rest of the party reinforces its theoretical isolation from other constituency campaigns.

The franchise model is closely associated with the practice of brokerage politics in Canada. Brokerage parties heighten their electoral appeal by downplaying social divisions within

the electorate, like a peculiar manifestation of Kirchheimer's (1966) "catch-all party." But unlike catch-all parties that target their appeal to specific groups of the electorate, brokerage parties appeal to every social group under the premise that only they can maintain national unity among conflicting social factions (Carty 2013). The franchise model allows parties to be defined by their leader, who conjures up policies that may be inconsistent with the past but address present challenges facing the polity. New members, activists, and candidates are brought into the party through nomination contests to (re)shape the partisan organizational ethos of the local party organization and execute campaigns specific to each riding style. The dual process enables the brokerage party to reinvent itself over time by bringing new interests into the fold and mediating disputes between interests in private, thereby enhancing its competitiveness by downplaying societal divisions.

The Conservative Party of Canada exhibits many features of the franchise model of party organization, such as one national office and hundreds of local branches in each riding. However, it is challenging to categorize it as a brokerage party. First, the party owes much of its partisan ethos to the Reform Party of Canada. Reform entered the national scene to express contempt for the brokerage politics that prioritized concerns in Ontario and Quebec over those in the West (Flanagan 2009: 51). The very origins of the Conservative Party rest on drawing divisions based on region. Second, only one brokerage party can exist in the system. The brokerage party bases its appeal as being the only entity that can hold the national polity together. The Liberal Party of Canada fulfills the position as chief brokerage party, which prioritized national unity between francophone and anglophone Canadians over regional concerns within the anglophone segment of the electorate (see Smith 1981). As Carty (2013: 18) concludes, "the Conservative Party can be best understood as a catch-all party wanting to expand

beyond its traditional ideological and regional bases in an effort to fashion a majority government.”

Indeed, the Conservative Party as resembling a catch-all party rests on regional imbalances of support. Conservative parties historically benefit from an overage of electoral support in Western Canada. Since 1957, conservative parties have championed agricultural policies that appeal directly to voters on the prairies, and stood later as the guardians of provincial control over natural resources, like agriculture and later energy policy. Support in the West is tied to less support in Quebec. This can be traced back to 1917. The conservative Union Government implemented conscription to fight World War I. Quebecers viewed mandatory involvement in the war effort as an affront to their francophone heritage and expressed their anger by voting Liberal. Quebec voting behaviour crystalized to an extent to vote predominantly for Liberal candidates until 1993. (Johnston 1992). The Conservative Party formed in 2003 inherited Western Canada as a regional bastion, but it also inherited challenges for appealing to voters east of Ontario.

Recent developments in the Canadian party system have altered party organizations by changing how political parties finance campaigns. The most important alterations for the period of study occurred in 2004 and 2006. In addition to replacing corporate and union donations with state subsidies (see Young and Jansen 2012 for a thorough discussion), the new party finance regime created unprecedented restrictions on how much money individuals could donate to a party each year. The Liberal Party in government first legislated a \$5,000 ceiling on individual contributions (Bill C-24, 2004) and the Conservative Party in government further restricted limits to \$1,000 in 2006 (*Accountability Act* 2006). These restrictions constrained the supply of

money available to local party organizations.<sup>3</sup> However, the same legislation did not restrict funding transfers within the party. Internal party transfers were exempt from being considered financial contributions (*Canada Elections Act*, 2000, s. 404.2(2)).<sup>4</sup>

Some argue that the new party finance regime damaged the franchise model by rendering local party organizations financially dependent on central party offices. The funding concentrated in the national party office corresponds to higher dispersions of national party funding in strategically important ridings between 2004 and 2007 (Coletto and Eagles 2012; Coletto et al. 2011). However, Conservative local party organizations moved \$1 million to other ridings in 2008 and \$2 million in 2011 (Elections Canada 2014). This appears counterintuitive because, in the franchise model of party organization, sending money to other ridings does little to maximize the local vote. Inter-association funding transfers are also not recognized in other research that examines resources within parties between 1988 and 2008 (Carty and Eagles 2005; Coletto and Eagles 2012). The presence of inter-association funding transfers within the Conservative Party warrants investigating the origins of these contributions and its theoretical consequences on the franchise model of party organization.

### **Collaboration Between Conservative Local Party Organizations: Methodology and Data**

The following section analyses inter-association funding transfers within the Conservative Party of Canada in 2008 and 2011. These two elections years are analysed because previous studies end their period of investigation in 2007. Studying party finance in 2008 and 2011 is also methodologically desirable because the party finance regime is constant during this

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<sup>3</sup> The donation ceiling increased to \$1,200 by 2011 (Young and Jansen, 2012: 6) and again to \$1,500 by 2014 with the passage of the *Fair Elections Act* (2013). It is also important to note this *Act* (2013) eliminated the per vote subsidy in 2014.

<sup>4</sup> Version of Canada Elections Act, 2000 in force until 2012.

period of analysis. The regime put in place in 2004 and altered in 2006 remains the same until 2014, whereas others investigate party organizations while the regulatory system is in flux (for example, Coletto and Eagles 2012; Coletto et. al 2011). I will briefly explain the dataset before demonstrating the Conservative Party is unique in using inter-association funding transfers to finance campaigns. The regional breakdown of income sent and received exposes financial resource flows out of the Conservative party on the ground in Alberta and into local party organizations in Atlantic Canada. To probe further, binomial logistic regression analysis is used to determine the constituency-level factors that determines the odds of making an inter-association funding while controlling for measure of district-level competition.

Financial data were collected from Elections Canada (2014; 2014a) administrative reports for electoral district associations and candidates. Information about candidates' sex and position in cabinet were collected from the Parliament of Canada (2014). These data require some disclaimers. Financial transfers between local party organizations are only observed in electoral district associations (EDAs). It is possible that candidates made transfers, too, but this information is contained in other financial reports not included in this dataset. This partially explains discrepancies in the data, such as Conservative EDAs reporting \$1.1 million sent but only \$1.0 million received in 2008. Data were copied and pasted from online financial reports into spreadsheets and from the spreadsheets into IBM SPSS Statistics 21.<sup>5</sup> The great amount of care devoted to this process does not eliminate any human error.

The binomial logistic regression model uses ten independent variables to estimate the log odds of making an inter-association funding transfer. Financial variables include EDA savings (end balance for 2007 and 2010), funding transfers received from the central party office,

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<sup>5</sup> I have not included descriptive statistics for the dataset due to space constraints. These statistics are available upon request. I am able to arrange viewings of the dataset.

funding transfers from the local EDA to the local candidate, and campaign spending by the local candidate. Dichotomous measures for whether the candidate is also in cabinet or female are also included. District-level competitiveness is measured using Bodet's (2013) stronghold and battleground variable.<sup>6</sup> This measure is recoded to specify which party maintains a strong hold over uncompetitive ridings. The next section analyses the results.

### **Regional Patterns and Local Incentives: The Results**

The Conservative Party on the ground relied heavily on inter-association funding transfers to finance organizations in strategically important ridings. Table 1.1 compares the amount of money national party offices sent to local party branches by the amount sent by other local party organizations for the three parties that conducted national campaigns. Compared to the Liberal Party and New Democratic Party, the Conservative Party relied as much on inter-association funding transfers as those from national office for supplementing the income of riding associations in 2008 and 2011. Electoral district associations contributed more money to riding associations than the national party office in 2011. In contrast, the Liberal and New Democratic Party national offices were the predominant source of supplementary income to local party organizations. The ratio of funding coming from their national offices grew substantially in 2011 from 2008. Collaboration between local party organizations appears to be a structural feature unique to the Conservative Party of Canada, a feature that is ideologically consistent with the decentralized populist ethos drawn from the Reform Party (see Flanagan 2013: 86).

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<sup>6</sup> Bodet's (2013) measure is better than using the margin of loss/victory to operationalize competition because it includes the present and previous election results to calculate stronghold and battleground classifications.

**Table 1.1: Inter-Association Funding Transfer Ratio**

Year	Conservative Party	Liberal Party	New Democratic Party
2008	1.49	5.17	20.20
2011	0.94	22.51	59.16

(Ratios higher than one indicate the central party gave more money to EDAs. Ratios below one indicate that EDAs gave more money than the central party).

The origin of inter-association funding transfers reflects the regional strengths and weaknesses of the Conservative Party. Table 1.2 presents inter-associations transfers sent and received by province. A third column documents the difference between money sent and money received to provide a better sense of regional variations. Positive scores indicate a higher sum of transfers sent than received (and vice versus) to indicate the extent that money moved within each province or to other regions.

Local party organizations in Alberta were the major source of income for riding associations in other provinces. Inter-association funding in Alberta are noteworthy because it is the only province with a net-loss of financial resources during both election years. Alberta EDAs sent a net amount of \$563,574.47 in 2008, or about half of the sum of inter-association funding transfers that year. Even though the proportional contribution declined to roughly one quarter of the sum of transfers during the next election, Conservative EDAs in Alberta increased their net-contribution in 2011 by \$50,000 to a total \$613,647.22. The half a million dollars that exited the Conservative Party on the ground in Alberta underscores the high level of support in that province: Conservative candidates were elected in all but one Alberta riding in 2008 and 2011.

**Table 1.2: Inter-Association Funding Transfers by Province (dollars, N in parentheses)**

Province	2008			2011		
	Money Sent	Money Received	Net Sent	Money Sent	Money Received	Net Sent
BC	175,723.70 (18)	212,346.00 (13)	-36,622.30	329,760.00 (17)	365,177.20 (13)	-35,417.20
AB	646,740.00 (18)	83,165.53 (9)	563,574.47	761,177.22 (17)	147,530.00 (10)	613,647.22
SK	51,074.50 (7)	98,922.75 (3)	-47,848.25	61,921.94 (9)	114,632.57 (6)	-52,710.63
MB	43,000.00 (4)	89,728.46 (6)	-46,728.46	168,857.18 (8)	162,090.00 (8)	6,767.18
ON	102,550.41 (16)	143,709.82 (21)	-41,159.41	404,360.25 (32)	576,200.00 (27)	-171,839.75
QB	67,549.78 (15)	182,674.01 (29)	-115,124.23	214,572.55 (9)	101,316.11 (12)	113,256.44
NB	4,873.44 (4)	12,924.20 (2)	-8,050.76	9,800.00 (2)	49,800.00 (4)	-40,000.00
PEI	3,130.55 (2)	19,000.00 (2)	-15,869.45	15,500.00 (2)	27,500.00 (2)	-12,000.00
NS	745.26 (2)	15,112.34 (4)	-14,367.08	50,969.99 (4)	202,384.69 (5)	-151,414.70
NFLD	9,135.82 (1)	97,135.82 (4)	-88,000.00	25,000.00 (3)	180,000.00 (6)	-155,000.00
Terr.	9,000.00 (1)	45,500.00 (2)	-36,500.00	10,000.00 (1)	63,733.57 (2)	-53,733.57
Total	1,113,523.46 (88)	1,000,218.93 (95)		1,998,206.13 (106)	1,990,364.14 (95)	

Conservative riding associations in Quebec were the only other to experience a net-outflow of money from the province.<sup>7</sup> These EDAs sent a net sum of \$113,256.44 in 2011. This is a reversal of the \$115,124.23 that local associations in the province retained in 2008. The reversal of net contributions is similar pattern to the Alberta case in the sense that the Conservative Party experienced low variations in electoral support over time. Quebec is not a region where the Conservative Party performed well. None of their Quebec candidates were

<sup>7</sup> Conservative EDAs in Manitoba made a net contribution to local branches outside the province, although it was marginal at \$6,767.18

elected in 2004. The net-flow of money out of Quebec EDAs is consistent with the Conservative Party's performance, electing only ten of the 74 candidates who ran in 2008 and five in 2011.

Conservative riding associations in nearly every other province sent less money than was received. This includes the other Prairie provinces of Saskatchewan and Manitoba, and British Columbia, Ontario, and Atlantic Canada. Regional patterns for net beneficiaries became clear in 2011.

Conservative EDAs in Atlantic Canada were the largest beneficiaries of inter-association funding transfers in 2011. Local branches in New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island (P.E.I.), Nova Scotia, and Newfoundland received a combined sum of \$358,414.70 more than they sent. The local branches in Nova Scotia and Newfoundland took in the bulk of this money. Both provinces received 85% of these transfers even though they appear less competitive than New Brunswick or P.E.I. For example, the Conservatives elected candidates in four of the ten ridings in Nova Scotia in 2011, compared to eight of the ten in New Brunswick. None of the Conservative candidates who ran in Newfoundland were elected in 2008 or 2011. The post-hoc results demonstrate the higher amount of competition facing Conservative candidates in Nova Scotia and Newfoundland and motivations for supplementing local candidates with money from other provinces.

Regional patterns of inter-association funding transfers reveal the electoral strategy pursued by the Conservative Party in 2008 and 2011, and are consistent with the practices of a catch-all party. Money was dispersed from local associations in two regions where it was unlikely to be as effective as in other regions of the country. The inter-association net outflow from Quebec was the strongest indication of the catch-all nature of the Conservative Party. These

financial resources could be more effective at increasing the number of Conservative candidates winning on election night if they were outside Quebec.

The regional patterns show the magnitude of inter-association transfers in each province, yet constituency-level factors also implicate the ability of each local party organization to collaborate with another. Constituency factors are central to understanding the local features that make inter-association funding transfer possible because it is the local-level where riding style and partisan organizational ethos manifest. Riding style is observed in the financial characteristics indicating the competency of the local organizations. Partisan organizational ethos is observed in whether a candidate is also a member of cabinet. The results are presented in Table 1.3 and the estimated odds for making a transfer to another EDA.

**Table 1.3: Local Factors for Making an Inter-Association Funding Transfer**

Variables	2008			2011		
	b	Odds Ratio	Sig.	b	Odds Ratio	Sig.
Savings	<b>1.535</b>	<b>4.640</b>	<b>0.000</b>	<b>0.514</b>	<b>1.672</b>	<b>0.037</b>
Funding from Central Party Office	0.012	1.012	0.914	<b>0.251</b>	<b>1.286</b>	<b>0.049</b>
Candidate Transfer	0.150	1.162	0.161	<b>0.208</b>	<b>1.231</b>	<b>0.048</b>
Campaign Spending	-0.419	0.657	0.500	-0.397	0.672	0.464
Cabinet	0.387	1.472	0.371	0.301	1.351	0.452
Female	0.065	1.067	0.859	-0.111	0.895	0.728
Battelground	-0.493	0.611	0.222	-0.237	0.789	0.485
Liberal Stronghold	-0.205	0.815	0.622	-0.010	0.990	0.982
NDP Stronghold	-0.788	0.455	0.207	0.500	1.648	0.314
BQ Stronghold	0.235	1.265	0.713	-0.170	0.843	0.823
Constant	-7.641	0.000	0.000	-3.881	0.021	0.004
-2Log Likelihood		312.26			356.51	
Hosmer and Lemeshow Test		12.19			11.21	
MacPhadden's Psuedo R2		0.1527			0.1010	
N		308			308	

Local parties made inter-association funding transfers when money was available. The odds ratios show that local party organizations were more likely to send an inter-association

transfer when savings were high and constituency campaign spending was low. Male candidates who served in cabinet also have high estimated odds ratios for transferring money. They were roughly 1.4 times more likely to send money to other constituency campaigns than candidates outside of campaigns, which reflects a cabinet minister's ability to solicit more donations compared to "lesser quality" candidates. It also demonstrates more incentives for a cabinet minister to help elect candidates in other ridings. Cabinet ministers are more likely to retain their influence within the party by assisting non-local campaigns. They are also more likely to return to influential positions within government if the party wins power by electing the most candidates. This provides constituency-level evidence that Conservatives sent money from well-resourced local party organizations that spent less money campaigning in their home riding.

The ability for a local party organization to make a transfer is also determined by lower amounts riding-level competition, although this relationship is more complicated than financial predictors. Local organizations in highly competitive battleground ridings were less likely to transfer money to other constituencies than those situated in Conservative Party strongholds. The same was true for Conservatives in Liberal Party strongholds but this relationship is not as strong. Those competing in New Democratic Party and Bloc Quebecois strongholds had changing predictability for transferring money between election years. Conservatives were less likely to send money from NDP strongholds in 2008 and more likely to in 2011. The opposite was true for Bloc held ridings. It is very possible that the fluidity of riding-level competition over time effects its relationship with inter-association funding transfers.

Finally, the model changes between election years and doubling of money transferred between local party organizations indicate progressive development of collaboration. The model reinforces the claim that local incentives determine which local branch makes a transfer while at

the same time suggests central coordination of collaboration. Receiving money from the national party office became an important factor for making a transfer in 2011 but had relatively no impact in 2008. The predictive power of the model also declines from 0.15 to 0.10 and may be weak evidence that inter-association transfers are local decisions. The data do not address the motivations for collaboration beyond high competency of the giving organization, but it worth openly speculating that local party organizations were collaborating with other campaigns at the request of the national party office.

## **Conclusion**

The Conservative Party of Canada reached beyond its regional stronghold in Western Canada through collaboration between local party organizations. Conservative franchises recognized the secondary market for campaign spending by dispersing money from uncompetitive ridings. Just to mention some individual cases, the \$99,000 sent from the Conservative Party in Calgary Southeast, or the \$32,000 sent from Vancouver Quadra, or the \$87,000 sent from Laurier-Saint Marie reduced the potential amount of campaign effort that each team could make at home so it could be utilized abroad.

Collaboration between local party organizations has implications for the franchise model of party organization. Local franchises can become concerned about the electoral success of franchises in other parts of the country. The evidence presented here shows that collaboration occurs in response to resource overages that build inside local party organizations situated in uncompetitive ridings. In the Conservative case, this manifests in catch-all party fashion by generating financial resources in one region with high electoral stability and dispersing them to others. The Conservative Party formed a majority government in 2011 in part by reducing the

amount of effort made in less competitive ridings. Of the 95 local party organizations that received an inter-association transfer 2011, 50 elected Conservative candidates to Parliament.

The data presented here have limited forecasting power beyond the conditions in which local party organizations become concerned with constituency campaigns in other ridings. It does not address the mechanisms that lead one organization to collaborate with another. Future research must address this process by interviewing the actors involved in making inter-association funding transfers, specifically whether collaboration is initiated locally or by the central party office. Interviewers should address the motivations for collaboration as it relates to brokerage versus catch-all party models. While the organizational patterns of the Conservative Party on the ground are consistent with the catch-all party model, it is also possible that local party organizations collaborate to influence the size of supportive factions within the party in public office.

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